Eta Terrorism: Police Action, Political Measures And The Influence Of Violence On Economic Activity In The Basque Country by Barros, CP et al.
 
 
ETA TERRORISM:  
POLICE ACTION, POLITICAL MEASURES AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF VIOLENCE ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE 
BASQUE COUNTRY 
 
 
 
Carlos P. Barros 
Technical University of Lisbon 
 
Guglielmo Maria Caporale  
Brunel University, London 
 
Luis A. Gil-Alana 
University of Navarra  
 
February 2006 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In the last 15 years or so, ETA activity has substantially decreased, but also changed. 
Whilst the type of killings has become more specialised (politicians, reporters, etc.), a 
new phenomenon based on urban guerrilla tactics, and called in Basque “kale 
borroka” (street fighting), has emerged, creating an atmosphere of violence in the 
streets. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we create a daily measure of 
the level of violence in the area. Second, we examine if police action and the repressive 
policy measures adopted by government have been effective in reducing the intensity of 
violence. Third, we investigate whether the level of violence has had an effect on the 
stock market index in the Basque Country. The results, based on daily data from July 
1st, 2001 to November 15th, 2005 suggest that the only effective measure to reduce 
violence was the banning of Herri Batasuna (HB), the radical party close to ETA 
supporters. Moreover, there was a decrease in the stock market index as a consequence 
of the violence in the area. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of terrorism on economic activity has already been investigated in various 
papers such as Drakos and Kutan (2003), Enders and Sandler (1991), Enders and 
Sandler (1996), Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992). However, these studies mainly focus 
on the impact of terrorist activities on tourism. For regions where tourism is not a 
predominant economic activity, the effects of terrorism on the stock exchange have 
hardly been analysed. A rare study of this type is Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). We 
revisit this issue in the present paper using an innovative approach.  
The motivation for our analysis is the observed persistence of ETA terrorism 
activity in the Basque Country. Despite the signing of various political agreements to 
put an end to violence, terrorism activity has survived in a different form, namely as 
Kale Borroka. This persistence, notwithstanding the stated intention and apparent 
political will of the Spanish government to find a solution to the Basque problem, 
suggests that the two sides are not engaged in a very effective dialogue, and therefore 
that terrorism activity might still be carried out in the near future. Moreover, the 
emergence of the radical Islamic terrorism in Europe raises the possibility of its 
developing links with the terrorist activities of ETA, which is a nationalist terrorist 
group. 
In order to analyse persistence in ETA terrorism and its impact on the stock market 
of the Basque Country this paper uses a novel method based on fractional integration 
which also allows for possible structural breaks. It improves upon related studies (e.g. 
Barros (2003), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Barros and Gil-Alana (2006), Barros, 
Passos and Gil-Alana (2006)) in three ways: first, it uses a new measure of terrorism; 
second, it examines explicitly its effects on the stock exchange in the Basque country; 
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third, it models persistence in a fractional integration framework allowing for breaks in 
the series. 
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2, we put the analysis in context by 
briefly reviewing the history of ETA; in section 3, we survey the empirical literature on 
this topic; in section 4, we present a new measure of the intensity of violence in the 
Basque Country; in section 5, we examine the different policies used to reduce the 
violence in the area. Section 6 analyses the effects of violence on the stock market, 
while Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  A brief history of ETA 
The acronym ETA stands for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty. The aim of its terrorist activities is to establish an independent state for the 
Basque people in the seven provinces in North-Eastern Spain and South-Western France 
where they have lived since ancient times. The group was created as an extreme, radical 
expression of the Basques’ profound pride in their own unique identity and culture and 
their determination to be recognized as a nation. Their language, Euskera, is a living 
testament to their origins and longevity, given that it has no links with any other known 
language and precedes all the Indo-European languages spoken in Europe. The 
protection of Euskera has long been a vital element of the Basques’ struggle. This long 
tradition makes their position within Europe rather unique.1  
Today, following four decades of harsh repression of the Basques and their 
homeland under Franco as a punishment for their opposition during the Spanish Civil 
War, the language is thriving in the autonomous region. Euskera radio and TV stations, 
newspapers and literature serve an estimated 750,000 fluent speakers (of a total 
                                                 
1  In the Middle Ages they defeated the French king Charlemagne in Roncesvalles (Orreaga, in Basque), 
(Chanson de Roland, unknown author, 1080). 
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population of 2.5 million Basques). The future survival of this language would appear to 
be secured, since more than 90% of Basque children study in Euskera schools.      
The nationalists consider the Basque Country to comprise seven provinces. Four of 
these are part of Spain. The other three belong to France. However, Spain only 
recognizes three provinces in the Basque Country, in what is called the “Comunidad 
Autónoma del País Vasco” (Basque Country Autonomous Community),  
Whilst many Basques may traditionally harbour dreams of sovereign nationhood, it 
should not be assumed that ETA therefore enjoys mass active support for its terrorist 
activities among the majority of the population. Since democracy returned to Spain in 
1975, the region has known great development and increased prosperity under the 
degree of autonomy granted by Madrid. Many Basques favour self-determination or 
increased autonomy, but wish to see this achieved through peaceful, political means 
rather than violence.  
ETA’s first military action took place in 1961 with an unsuccessful attempt to derail 
a train carrying civil war veterans travelling to Donostia (San Sebastian) to celebrate the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Spanish Civil War. They then planted explosives in the 
police headquarters of the Basque cities of Bilbao and Vitoria (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 
2003). Henceforward, they maintained continuous terrorist activity, with assassinations 
and kidnapping beginning in 1968. After a popular ETA activist was killed by the police 
in 1968, ETA produced its first victims, assassinating an inspector of the Policia 
Nacional and a member of the Guardia Civil. The Franco Government reacted by 
putting the entire Basque region under a prolonged siege. Thousands were jailed, 
tortured, and exiled, culminating in the 1970 Burgos trial and imprisonment of over a 
dozen ETA leaders. During the mid-1970s, ETA activities increased sharply, with 1978 
to 1980 being their bloodiest years. In December 1973, ETA assassinated the Spanish 
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premier and putative successor to Franco, Luis Carrero Blanco, which marked a 
watershed in terrorist actions.  
The long-ruling dictator Franco died in 1975, and democracy was restored. This was 
to lead to the Basque region being granted a degree of autonomy (by the Estatuto de 
Autonomía del País Vasco, promulgated in 1979) with its own parliament, control over 
several areas such as education and taxes, and the promotion of the Basque language in 
schools. 
In the last 15 years or so, ETA activity has substantially decreased, but also 
changed. The number of victims has considerably fallen, the type of killings becoming 
more specialized (politicians, reporters, etc.). On the other hand, a new phenomenon 
based on urban guerrilla tactics, and called in Basque “Kale Borroka” (street fighting), 
has emerged, creating an atmosphere of violence in the streets. This can characterised as 
low-intensity urban terrorism fomented by ETA, and amounts to street hooliganism 
perpetrated by the youth wing of the terrorist movement. According to the UN 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Spain: “these acts have deteriorated to such a point 
that it affects not only the fundamental rights of individuals but also the free exercise of 
certain civil and political rights which are the basis and foundation of every 
democracy”. (Gil-Robles, 2001). 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 does not explicitly provide for the independence 
of the Basque Country, and it was against this backdrop that ETA continued its strategy 
of individual terrorism during the transition period as well. In December 1982, the left-
wing Socialist Party came to power and set up the anti-terrorist group GAL (Anti-
Terrorist Liberation Group) to combat ETA. These were para-military death squads that 
were active from 1983 to 1987. The GAL units hunted down ETA members, and killed 
at least 28 of them. In January 1988, all the political parties with representation in the 
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Basque Parliament, with the exception of HB (Herri Batasuna, the radical nationalist 
party), signed the agreement known as the Pact of Ajuria-Enea, in the firm belief that 
the only way to achieve normality and peace in the Basque Country was to respect the 
choices and desires of the Basque people. Negotiations to end ETA violence were held 
in Algeria in 1992 but failed in their objective. Unsuccessful ETA attempts on the life 
of Prime Ministerial candidate José María Aznar and of King Juan Carlos, in April and 
August 1995 respectively, were among the most notorious attacks. Aznar’s Popular 
Party was elected in May 1996 and reinforced and maintained the hard-line approach on 
terrorism until its unexpected demise in March 2004, precipitated by what turned out to 
be radical Islamic terrorist attacks in Madrid 3 days before the elections.  
By the late 1990’s ETA had lost most of its support in the main cities and important 
ETA commando cells had been eliminated by the police. As a result, the organization 
changed its strategy. Together with other nationalist parties, the parliamentary 
representation of ETA (EH, Euskal Herritarrok, or "We Basque Citizens”, former HB), 
approved the so-called “Treaty of Lizarra” in the fall of 1998. This declaration 
contained the obligation to hold open, but exclusively Basque, negotiations on the 
political future of the Basque Country. Following the signing of this treaty, ETA 
announced an unlimited, unconditional ceasefire in September 1998. 
The ceasefire was maintained until 3 December 1999. ETA’s justifications for 
resuming its attacks were the unchanging hard-line stance of the Spanish Government 
against the separatists and the weak response of the moderate nationalists to the latter. 
In fact, scarcely any negotiations took place. Aznar was only willing to discuss the 
transfer of a few ETA prisoners to Basque Country jails and the disarming of the 
organization. Under no circumstances was the Government prepared to grant ETA more 
influence in Basque politics, let alone contemplate the group’s unequivocal demand for 
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independence and unification of all Basque provinces, including the three provinces in 
France. 
On the contrary, Aznar never left any doubts as to his determination to solve the 
Basque question by police methods, and stepped up the pursuit of ETA members during 
this period. Since ETA had apparently used the ceasefire period to improve its logistics 
and stock up explosives and weapons, it was only a matter of time before violence 
would break out again. The hardline position of the Popular Party against ETA included 
political measures such as the closing down of radio stations and newspapers (Egin, 
July, 1998; Egunkaria, February, 2003) or the “Ley de Partidos” (June, 2002) that led to 
the banning of Herri Batasuna from political activity (August, 2002). 
 
3. Literature Review 
The economics literature on terrorism is rather limited (for a relatively up to date 
survey, see Enders and Sandler, 1995).  Two main types of empirical studies can be 
found: time series models and cross-section or panel data models. Within this literature, 
ETA has been the subject of more papers than other known terrorist organisation. One 
reason for such emphasis on ETA is its longevity. Many time series studies on ETA use 
intervention analysis, regressing the number of terrorist incidents on indicators of policy 
intervention, to evaluate the effectiveness of the adopted policy (Enders and Sandler, 
1993). Papers in this mould are Barros (2003), who analysed ETA killings and kidnaps 
with a VAR model from 1968 to 2000; Barros and Gil-Alana (2006), who estimated a 
fractional integration model for ETA attacks; and Barros, Passos and Gil-Alana (2006), 
who investigated the duration of ETA attacks with several duration models.  
Alternatively, other studies use economic-impact analysis, regressing economic 
variables on terrorist incidents, to evaluate the economic impact of terrorism. For 
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instance, Enders and Sandler (1991) estimated a first-order VAR (Vector Auto-
Regression) model to evaluate the economic impact of terrorism on tourism in Spain 
during the period from 1970 to 1988 (see also Enders (2004)).  Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003) analysed the economic impact of ETA terrorism on GDP, concluding that there 
was an average 10% gap between per-capita GDP in the Basque Country and the per-
capita GDP of a comparable region that does not suffer from terrorism. Moreover, when 
analysing Basque market-listed companies in comparison with non-Basque listed 
companies, they concluded that the former show a negative performance as an 
externality of terrorism.  The present paper adopts this second time series approach to 
examine the impact of terrorism attacks on economic variables. In contrast to earlier 
studies, which treat terrorist events as stationary (Enders and Sandler, 1996), we model 
the order of integration of ETA terrorism attacks with fractional integration techniques, 
which allow for intra-annual integration. Second, we model possible breaks in the series 
within the fractional integration framework. Finally, we use information on Basque 
stock market prices to evaluate the impact of ETA violence. 
 
4. Measuring the intensity of violence 
Measures of the intensity of violence are usually based on counting violent episodes. 
For example, the ITERATE data set, the most renowned terrorist data set, counts the 
number of terrorist attacks and the number of killings, as well as other terrorist events. 
However, these methods are rather uni-dimensional as they inevitably lump together a 
large variety of terrorist actions. An alternative way to measure terrorism actions is to 
use a Likert-type variable defined as varying between zero and five to account for 
different types of terrorism intensity. This is the procedure adopted in the present paper.  
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Such a Likert-type variable ranging between 0 and 5 enables us to compare 
different types of terrorism activity with different social impact, and to construct a 
terrorist index. Index variables in addition to the one adopted in the paper can be found 
in papers using questionnaire data (see, e.g., Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) and Morris and 
Pavet (1992). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 The Likert-type variable employed in this paper refers to the daily level of 
violence in the Basque Country and will be denoted by DVIt. This variable takes a value 
of 0 if there has not been any violent incident related to ETA terrorism during a single 
day. It takes a value of 1 (Very Low Level of Violence) if there has been only a small 
number (≤ 5) of incidents of “kale borroka” across the Basque geography. It takes a 
value of 2 (Low Level of Violence) if there are more than 5 acts of kale borroka in a 
single day. DVIt = 3 (Medium Level of Violence) if there are generalized incidents of 
kale borroka or if ETA has put bombs with less than 5 kilograms of explosives. Level 4 
(High Level of Violence) is achieved with ETA bombs which are stronger than 5 
kilograms of explosives or if there have been serious injuries as a consequence of a 
terrorist attack. Finally, Level 5 (Very High Level of Violence) occurs when there are 
one or more fatalities in the attacks. Although this classification does not distinguish 
between one or more than one killing in a single day of terrorist activity, we would 
argue that the death of even a single person is sufficiently important to be defined as the 
highest level of violence. 
 From a first inspection of the data one can see that the sample mean for the 
variable in the period analysed in the paper (1st July, 2001 – 15th November, 2005) is 
relatively low (0.8011), implying a level of violence slightly below Level 1, which 
corresponds to the category “Very Low Level of Violence”; this is considerably lower 
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than in previous periods (e.g., 1978-1980, with a mean value higher than 4; or the 
decade of the 80s, with a value of around 3.5) 
 Another feature of these data is that there is not a monotonic decrease in violent 
activity during the recent period: the annual means from 2001 through 2005 are equal to 
1.364, 0.879, 0.671, 0.720 and 0.691, respectively. Moreover, the values displayed in 
Figure 1, which correspond to the monthly averages, show that the highest level of 
violence occurred in November 2005, that is, the last month in the sample.2
 
5. Deterrence policies  
In this section we examine which factors may affect the daily level of violence in the 
Basque Country (DVIt). For this purpose, we first run linear regressions using as 
dependent variables the following ones: ARRt: daily number of arrests related to ETA 
violence; LEADt: a step dummy increasing by 1 each time the police arrest ETA 
leaders; EGKt: a dummy variable equal to 1 after the police closed the Basque 
newspaper Egunkaria (February 20th, 2002); HBt: a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
after Herri Batasuna was declared illegal (August 27th, 2002); and finally, 11-Mt: a 
dummy variable equal to 1 after the March 11th Islamic attack in Madrid. These 
variables are fully described in Table 2. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 We estimate by Ordinary (Generalized) Least Squares (OLS-GLS) the following 
regression model: 
DVIt  = a1  +  a2 ARRt  +  a3 LEADt  + a4 EGKt  + a5 HBt  + a6 11Mt  +  ut   (1) 
where ut is the error term, adopting different ARMA representations. Table 3 displays 
the estimated coefficients, assuming that ut is an ARMA(1,1) process. The specification 
                                                 
2  At the time of writing (February, 2006) the violence still persists in the Basque Country, and the 
average monthly values for December 2005 and January 2006 are respectively 0.719 and 0.662. 
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was chosen according to the AIC and BIC criteria. It can be seen immediately from this 
Table that only LEAD, EGK and HB have a negative effect on ETA violence. By 
contrast, the number of daily arrests and the 11-M attacks have a positive coefficient. 
An explanation for the positive coefficient on the number of arrests might be the fact 
that, when police arrest people in the Basque Country, this usually provokes incidents in 
the streets by ETA supporters, thereby increasing the acts of “kale borroka” and the 
feeling of violence. On the other hand, the two political measures (closeness of 
Egunkaria and banning of Herri Batasuna) have a negative coefficient, though only the 
latter is significant at conventional statistical levels, suggesting that, according to our 
model, this was the only effective measure to reduce violence in the area. 
However, the analysis presented so far is based upon the assumption that the 
error term ut in equation (1) is integrated of order 0, i.e., ut ~ I(0). In our view, it is 
plausible to think instead that the level of violence in the Basque Country instead 
follows an I(d) process with d > 0. In fact some earlier studies have shown that ETA 
violence is integrated of order d with d strictly higher than 0 (see Barros and Gil-Alana, 
2006). Thus, in what follows, we assume that the level of violence (DVIt) is described 
by (1) with ut given by: 
...,2,1,)1( ==− tvuL ttd    (2) 
where vt is I(0). Hence, if d = 0, we are in the previous case, analysed in Table 3. We 
now test: 
,: oo ddH =      (3) 
for any real value do in a model given by (1) and (2), assuming that vt is white noise, 
AR, etc. 
 In Table 4 we report the results based on Robinson’s (1994) statistic, testing Ho 
(3) in (1) and (2), for do-values = 0, 0.10, …, 1, assuming that vt is white noise, AR(1) 
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and AR(2) respectively. Higher AR orders and MA processes were also employed and 
the results were in line with those presented here. The statistic proposed by Robinson 
(1994) is fully described in the Appendix, and follows a standard normal distribution. 
Thus, significantly positive values imply rejections of the null in favour of alternatives 
of the form: d > do, and, similarly, significant negative ones imply rejections of the null 
in favour of smaller orders of integration (d < do). We can see in Table 4 that, if d = 0, 
the null hypothesis is rejected for all types of disturbances in favour of alternatives of 
the form d > 0, implying long-memory behaviour. We can also note that if vt is white 
noise or AR(1) the null cannot be rejected for do = 0.10, and, if vt is AR(2), the non-
rejections take place for values of do constrained between 0.10 and 0.20. Hence, in 
Table 5, we display the statistics for a range of do-values constrained between 0.10 and 
0.20 with 0.01 increments. Note that the lowest statistic in absolute value should 
correspond to a value of d that is an approximation to the maximum likelihood 
estimate.2
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 The results in Table 5 show that, if vt is white noise, Ho cannot be rejected for 
values of d constrained between 0.10 and 0.15, and the lowest statistic corresponds to do 
= 0.12. When allowing for autocorrelated disturbances, we observe more non-rejections 
and the lowest statistics occur in both cases at do = 0.13. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 Table 6 displays the estimated coefficients for each type of disturbances in the 
cases of the lowest statistics. Similarly to the I(0) case, negative coefficients (implying a 
reduction in the level of violence) are found for the arrests of ETA coup-members and 
                                                 
2 Robinson’s (1994) statistic is based on the Whittle function, that is an approximation to the likelihood 
function. 
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the two political measures (closing down of Egunkaria and banning of HB); however, 
only the latter variable appears to be significant at conventional statistical levels. 
 The results presented so far seem to indicate that only the banning of HB 
produced a significant reduction in terrorist activities in the Basque Country. This took 
place in August 2002. Next, we examine the possibility of a structural break in the data, 
and, for this purpose, we use a simple procedure that enables us to estimate the 
deterministic components, the orders of integration and the time of the break 
endogenously to the model. Note that since the series of interest, the daily intensity of 
violence, is not I(0), standard procedures like Bai and Perron (1998) cannot be directly 
applied. We assume that there is a unique break in the data, occurring at time Tb, and 
consider a model of the form: 
,,...,2,1,)1(; 11 btt
d
tt TtuxLxy ==−+= α  
,,...,1,)1(; 22 TTtuxLxy btt
d
tt +==−+= α  
where d1 and d2 correspond respectively to the orders of integration of the first and the 
second subsample. Note that the model above can be expressed as: 
    (4) ,,...,2,1,1)1()1( 111 btt
d
t
d TtuLyL =+−=− α
    (5) ,,...,1,1)1()1( 222 TTtuLyL btt
d
t
d +=+−=− α
where 1t = 1 for all t. First, we choose a grid for the values of the fractionally 
differencing parameters d1 and d2, for example, dio = 0, 0.01, 0.02, …, 1, i = 1, 2. Then, 
for a given partition {Tb} and given d1, d2-values, , we estimate the α's by 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
)d,d( )j( o2
)j(
o1
[ ] [ ]
}2,1,2,1{...
1
222
1
111 )(1
~)1()(1~)1(min
ββαα
αα
trw
T
bTt
otto
dbT
t
otto
d dyLdyL ∑
+=
∑
=
−−+−−
. 
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Let  denote the resulting estimates for partition {T),;(ˆ )1(2
)1(
1 oob ddTα b} and initial 
values  and . Substituting these estimated values into the objective function, we 
get RSS(T
)1(
1od
)1(
2od
b; , ), and minimizing this expression across all values of d)1(1od
)1(
2od 1o and d2o 
in the grid we obtain: 
).,;(minarg)( )(2
)(
1},{
j
o
i
objib ddTRSSTRSS =  
Then, the estimated break date, , is such that kTˆ
)(minargˆ ...,,1 imik TRSST == , 
where the minimization is over all partitions T1, T2, …, Tm, such that Ti - Ti-1 ≥ |εT|. The 
regression parameter estimates are the associated least-squares estimates of the 
estimated k-partition, i.e., 
}),ˆ({ˆˆ kii Tαα =  
 and their corresponding differencing parameters, 
}),ˆ({ˆˆ kii Tdd =  
for i = 1 and 2. 
 We do not report asymptotic results for the rates of convergence of the 
estimates, though they should be similar to those in Bai and Perron (1998), since we 
choose the values in such a way as to minimize the residual sum of squares and, under 
the appropriate specification, ut should follow an I(0) process. Some Monte Carlo 
results based on this approach can be found in Gil-Alana (2006), where it is shown that 
this procedure correctly estimates the timing of the breaks and produces very accurate 
estimates  of the model parameters, especially if the sample size is large. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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 Table 7 reports the estimates of model (4) and (5) assuming that ut is white noise 
and autocorrelated. In the latter case we suppose that ut follows an AR(1) process. We 
also tried higher AR and MA processes, obtaining similar results. Starting with the case 
of white noise disturbances, we can see that the break takes place on May 8th, 2002, 
which is a few months before the banning of HB, though at that time it was already 
known that this would take place.3 As expected, the estimate of the intercept is higher in 
the first subsample, and significant in both subsamples. Interestingly, the order of 
integration is substantially higher in the second subsample (0.14 compared with 0.03 in 
the first subsample). When ut is assumed to follow an AR(1) process the results are very 
similar. The break occurs on May 1st, 2002, and the first subsample seems to follow an 
I(0) process, while d2 = 0.15.  The estimates for the intercepts are now 1.267 for the first 
subsample and 0.689 after the banning of HB, and both are statistically significant. On 
the whole, it would appear that there has been a substantial reduction in the intensity of 
the violence in the Basque Country since HB has been declared illegal; however, its 
persistence has increased as a result of the adoption of this measure. 
 
 
6. Violence and economic activity 
In this section we examine whether the level of violence in the Basque Country has had 
any effect on economic activity in the area. For this purpose, we use the DVI variable 
described in Section 3 as an indicator of the level of violence, and the Bilbao Stock 
Market index (BSMt) as an indicator of economic activity. 
[Insert Figures 1 – 3 about here] 
First, we examine the statistical properties of the individual series. Stock market 
indices are generally believed to be nonstationary, and to contain a unit root. On the 
                                                 
3  The “Ley de Partidos” was promulgated in June 2002. 
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other hand, visual inspection of the monthly averages of the DVI series, in Figure 1, 
seems to suggest that series in hand is stationary. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 Table 8 shows the fractional integration results for the two series. Note that the 
fractional integration approach nests the two classic cases of modelling statistical time 
series, the stationary case (d = 0) and the unit root approach (d = 1). We report the 95% 
confidence intervals as well as the quasi maximum likelihood estimate of d (in 
parenthesis within the brackets) in the frequency domain, assuming that the two series 
are I(d) with white noise, AR and Bloomfield disturbances.4
 It can be seen that, for the stock market index, the values of d are close to 1 in all 
cases, ranging from 0.95 to 1.09. However, for the level of violence, the values are 
much smaller, ranging from 0.13 to 0.30. Thus, while BSM is clearly nonstationary and 
probably I(1), DVI is stationary, though with a component of long memory behaviour.5 
Moreover, the fact that the two series exhibit different orders of integration invalidates 
any inference based on cointegration models. Consequently, in what follows, we 
assume that DVI is weakly exogenous, and consider a model of the following form: 
    ,tktt xDVIBSM ++= −βα    (6) 
      ,)1( tto
d uxL =−
with k in (6) equal to 0, 1, 2 and 3 and white noise and AR(1) and AR(2) disturbances 
ut. As an alternative approach, we could have employed a dynamic lag-structure for 
DVI in (6) in line with the literature on dynamic regressions in standard models. 
However, that approach would have imposed the same degree of integration across the 
lags, whilst ours allows d to take different values for each lag.  
                                                 
4 The model of Bloomfield (1973) is a non-parametric approach of modelling the I(0) disturbances, that 
produces autocorrelations decaying exponentially as in the AR(MA) case. 
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Table 9 reports, for each type of disturbances and for each k, the estimates for 
the coefficients (and their corresponding t-ratios), the value of do producing the lowest 
statistic, its confidence interval (at the 95% level) and the values for the short-run (AR) 
parameters. It can be seen that the results are robust to the different type of disturbances. 
The estimates of d are around 1 in all cases, and the slope coefficient only appears 
significant when k = 1, with a negative value, implying that an increase in the level of 
daily violence in the streets produces a reduction in the stock market index in the 
following period. 
The final part of the analysis considers the possibility of a structural break in the 
stock market index, and applies the same procedure used in Section 4 to examine the 
relationship between the level of violence and the stock market index in the following 
period. Thus, the model is now 
btt
d
t
d
t
d TtuDVILLBSML ,...,1,)1(1)1()1( 111111 =+−+−=− −βα  
,,...,1,)1(1)1()1( 122222 TTtuDVILLBSML btt
d
t
d
t
d +=+−+−=− −βα  
and we jointly estimate d1o, α1, β1, d2o, α2, β2 along with the time break Tb by 
minimizing the RSS for a grid of values of Tb = T/10, T/10+1, …, 9T/10-1, 9T/10. The 
results are displayed in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 Starting with the case of white noise disturbances, we can see that both 
coefficients, the intercept (α1) and the slope (β1), are significant in the first subsample, 
while only the intercept (α2) is significant after the break, which occurs on July 4th, 2002 
(i.e. one month after the promulgation of the “Ley de Partidos”, and one month before 
                                                                                                                                               
5  This latter result is consistent with Barro and Gil-Alana (2006) who found evidence of long memory (d 
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the banning of HB). The orders of integration oscillate around 1 in the two subsamples, 
with values of 1.03 and 0.95 respectively. We also find that the slope coefficient is 
negative in both cases, though only significant before the break, implying that the 
negative effect of violence on the stock market was stronger before the break. If ut 
follows an AR(1) process, the two orders of integration are slightly below unity (0.97 
and 0.98), and the slope coefficients are negative though insignificant in the two 
subsamples. The coefficients associated to the AR component are close to 0, suggesting 
that the white noise specification could be an adequate choice for this series. On the 
whole, the level of violence seems to affect negatively the stock market, with a stronger 
effect before the banning of Herri Batasuna. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In the last 15 years or so, ETA activity has substantially decreased, but also changed. 
Whilst the number of carefully selected victims (politicians, reporters, etc.) has fallen, 
more diffuse violence has emerged, in the form of urban guerrilla tactics, known in 
Basque as “kale borroka” (street fighting). This paper has aimed to analyse this new 
phenomenon and its economic consequences. Its contribution is threefold. First, we 
have created a daily measure of the level of violence in the area. Second, we have 
examined if police action and the repressive policy measures adopted by government 
have been effective in reducing the intensity of violence. Third, we have investigated 
whether the level of violence has had an effect on the stock market index in the Basque 
Country. We have improved upon earlier studies not only by using a more appropriate 
measure of the level of violence, but also by modelling its high degree of persistence  by 
means of fractional integration techniques,  and allowing for possible breaks. 
                                                                                                                                               
> 0) in the number of killings by ETA from 1968 to 2002 using the ITERATE database. 
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Our results, based on daily data from July 1st, 2001 to November 15th, 2005, 
suggest that the only effective measure to reduce violence was the banning of Herri 
Batasuna (HB), the radical party close to ETA supporters (the average values for the 
level of violence before and after the banning being 1.1184 and 0.6877 respectively). 
This controversial measure (which the majority of the Basque population opposes) 
appears to have successfully reduced the level of violence, though, at the same time, it 
has increased its degree of persistence. Moreover, there was a decrease in the stock 
market index as a result of the violence in the area, especially during the period prior to 
the banning of HB. 
What policy measures should then be adopted on the basis of our findings? 
Simply banning Herri Batasuna appears not to be a recommendable policy, if one takes 
into account the persistence of ETA terrorism (see Barros and Alana (2006)), and the 
negative effects on the stock market (and possibly on growth and employment) in the 
region). In order to achieve a decrease in both political violence and its persistence, a 
political agreement seems indispensable. In its absence, one should expect ETA 
violence to continue in the future. Finding a way to eliminate national terrorism has 
become a necessity not only for economic reasons, but also to be able to focus on 
appropriate deterrence policies to deal with the rise of radical Islamic terrorism, which 
poses an increasing threat to Western societies. 
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Appendix A 
The LM test of Robinson (1994) for testing Ho (3) in (1) and (2) is  
aATr ˆˆ
ˆ
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aˆ  and  in the above expressions are obtained through the first and second derivatives 
of the log-likelihood function with respect to d (see Robinson, 1994, page 1422, for 
further details). I(λ
Aˆ
j) is the periodogram of ut evaluated under the null, i.e.: 
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and g is a known function related to the spectral density function of ut:  
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TABLE 1 
Measuring the level of terrorist violence 
Level 0 No violence activity 
Level 1 Very low level of violence (small acts of kale borroka) 
Level 2 Low level of violence (Acts of kale borroka) 
Level 3 Medium level of violence (Bombs with less than 5 kg of explosives; Kidnappings; Generalized acts of kale borroka)
Level 4 High level of violence (Bombs with more than 5 kg of explosives; Serious injuries as a consequence of a terrorist attack)
Level 5 Very high level of violence (Assassinations; Fatalities as a consequence of a terrorist attack) 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Description of the variables used in the paper 
Name Definition Range Mean Stand. Dev. 
DVIt Level of daily Violence Intensity [0  -  5] 0.8011 1.4644 
ARRt Number of daily arrests [0   -   80] 0.9662 3.7355 
LEADt Step dummy ETA leaders arrests [0   -   14] 5.3721 6.6601 
EGKt Dummy variable for the close of EGUNKARIA [0   -   1] 0.6253 0.7908 
HBt Dummy variable for the banning of HB [0   -   1] 0.7360 0.8579 
11-Mt Dummy variable for the 11-M attack in Madrid [0   -   1] 0.3839 0.6196 
BSMt Bilbao daily Stock Market Index [976.32 – 1956.35] 1410.87 1428.50 
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FIGURE 1 
Monthly average of the daily level of violence intensity in the Basque Country 
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FIGURE 2 
Monthly number of arrests related to ETA violence  
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FIGURE 3 
Monthly average of the Bilbao 2000 Stock Market Index                 
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TABLE 3 
Estimated coefficients based on the standard I(0) regression model 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic 
Constant term 1.131886 0.098763 11.46066 
ARRt 0.007656 0.008206 0.933060 
LEADt -0.010443 0.030147 -0.346393 
EGKt -0.011525 0.174010 -0.066230 
HBt -0.414802 0.175394 -2.364973 
11-Mt 0.085630 0.203060 0.421699 
AR(1) coefficient 0.816661 0.056092 14.55933 
MA(1) coefficient -0.709542 0.068595 -10.34392 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Testing the order of integration in the regression model given by (1) and (2) 
d White noise AR (1) AR (2) 
0.00 8.859 5.505 13.814 
0.10 1.184 1.013 2.469 
0.20 -3.400 -1.841 -5.025 
0.30 -6.627 -4.171 -10.735 
0.40 -8.950 -6.039 -15.083 
0.50 -10.665 -7.534 -18.427 
0.60 -11.980 -8.782 -21.085 
0.70 -13.038 -9.886 -23.294 
0.80 -13.903 -10.845 -25.156 
0.90 -14.611 -11.655 -26.743 
1.00 -15.202 -12.344 -28.129 
In bold: Non-rejection values of the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 5 
Testing the order of integration for a shorter range of values of d 
d White noise AR (1) AR (2) 
0.11 0.647 0.704 1.627 
0.12 0.130** 0.400 0.806 
0.13 -0.369 0.101** 0.007** 
0.14 -0.850 -0.192 -0.771 
0.15 -1.314 -0.480 -1.529 
0.16 -1.762 -0.763 -2.267 
0.17 -2.193 -1.041 -2.985 
0.18 -2.610 -1.313 -3.684 
0.19 -3.012 -1.580 -4.364 
 **: Lowest statistic for each type of disturbances 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Estimated coefficients based on the standard I(0) regression model 
Disturbances White noise AR(1) disturbances AR(2) disturbances 
 Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
Constant term 1.098442 (9.211) 1.109670 (8.868) 1.118376 (9.078) 
ARRt 0.008816 (1.072) 0.008619 (1.048) 0.008754 (1.063) 
LEADt -0.002560 (-0.079) -0.003925 (-0.118) -0.004279 (-0.132) 
EGKt -0.043013 (-0.228) -0.048220 (-0.248) -0.045793 (-0.240) 
HBt -0.366006 (-1.937) -0.363589 (-1.865) -0.371215 (-1.940) 
11-Mt 0.036537 (0.169) 0.043704 (0.196) 0.043997 (0.201) 
AR(1) coefficient --- -0.011666 (-0.465) -0.012395 (-0.494) 
AR(2) coefficients --- --- -0.019833 (-0.790) 
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TABLE 7 
Parameter estimates with a single break 
 White noise AR (1) disturbances 
α1 1.270 1.267 
(t-value α1) (14.256) (16.424) 
α2 0.689 0.689 
(t-value α2) (8.628) (8.072) 
d1 0.03 0.00 
d2 0.14 0.15 
Tb May 8th, 2002 May 1st, 2002 
AR coeff. (1st s.) --- 0.051 
AR coeff. (2nd s.) --- -0.013 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Estimating the order of integration of each series 
Disturbances BSMt DVIt
White noise [0.95  (0.97)  1.00] [0.13  (0.15)  0.17] 
AR (1) [0.95  (0.99)  1.04] [0.17  (0.21)  0.24] 
AR (2) [0.97  (1.03)  1.09] [0.17  (0.23)  0.30] 
Bloomfield (1) [0.96  (0.99)  1.04] [0.15  (0.18)  0.23] 
Bloomfield (2) [0.97  (1.02)  1.06] [0.18  (0.21)  0.27] 
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TABLE 9 
Testing the effects of violence intensity on the stock market index 
Model:    BSMt = β0 + β1DVIt + xt;      (1  -  L)d xt = ut;    ut is I(0) 
ut K Conf. Interval d β0 (S.E.) β0 (S.E.) α1 α1
k = 0 [0.95   1.00] 0.97 1539.34 (114.00) 0.2712 (1.256) --- --- 
k = 1 [0.95   1.00] 0.98 1539.64 (114.10) -0.4656 (-2.158) --- --- 
k = 2 [0.95   1.00] 0.98 1570.30 (116.30) -0.0002 (-0.001) --- --- 
 
White noise 
k = 3 [0.95   1.00] 0.97 1560.14 (115.54) -0.0091 (-0.042) --- --- 
k = 0 [0.95   1.04] 0.99 1538.18 (113.86) 0.2725 (1.275) -0.027 --- 
k = 1 [0.95   1.03] 0.98 1538.07 (114.06) -0.4644 (-2.165) -0.018 --- 
k = 2 [0.94   1.04] 0.98 1568.71 (116.38) -0.0012 (-0.005) -0.017 --- 
 
 
AR (1) 
k = 3 [0.93   1.03] 0.99 1558.55 (115.67) -0.0091 (-0.042) -0.018 --- 
k = 0 [0.97   1.10] 1.03 1539.79 (114.14) 0.2744 (1.310) -0.068 -0.049 
k = 1 [0.94   1.08] 1.01 1539.58 (114.21) -0.4608 (-2.181) -0.047 -0.035 
k = 2 [0.93   1.10] 1.01 1571.54 (116.62) -0.0086 (-0.040) -0.038 -0.031 
 
 
AR (2) 
k = 3 [0.92   1.10] 1.00 1561.09 (115.88) -0.0056 (-0.026) -0.030 -0.026 
BSMt is the stock market index and DVIt is the violence intensity. 
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TABLE 10 
Parameter estimates with a single break 
 White noise AR (1) disturbances 
α1 1539.47 1539.31 
(t-value α1) (89.801) (86.333) 
β1 -1.033 -0.730 
(t-value β1) (-2.216) (1.484) 
α2 1259.37 1195.84 
(t-value α2) (105.02) (104.23) 
β2 -0.197 -0.039 
(t-value β2) (-0.019) (0.177) 
d1 1.03 0.97 
d2 0.95 0.98 
Tb July 4th, 2002 July 29th, 2002 
AR coeff. (1st s.) --- 0.071 
AR coeff. (2nd s.) --- -0.062 
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